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Abstract: Desktop browsers have introduced private browsing mode, a security control which aims 
to protect users’ data that are generated during a private browsing session, by not storing 
them in the file system. As the Internet becomes ubiquitous, the existence of this security 
control is beneficial to users, since privacy violations are increasing, while users tend to 
be more concerned about their privacy when browsing the web in a post-Snowden era. In 
this context, this work examines the protection that is offered by the private browsing mode 
of the most popular desktop browsers in Windows (i.e., Chrome, Firefox, IE and Opera). 
Our experiments uncover occasions in which even if users browse the web with a private 
session, privacy violations exist contrary to what is documented by the browser. To raise 
the bar of privacy protection that is offered by web browsers, we propose the use of a 
virtual filesystem as the storage medium of browsers’ cache data. We demonstrate with a 
case study how this countermeasure protects users from the privacy violations, which are 
previously identified in this work.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since Internet penetration has risen in the last years (almost 3.4 million users by the end of 
2015 (Internetworldstats, 2016)) it is important to preserve an adequate level of privacy to 
protect the average user while browsing the web. Average users, i.e., those who are not tech-
nical, nor security savvy, rely on the default security countermeasures that are provided by the 
popular web browsers, such as protection from sites serving malware or hosting phishing at-
tacks. However, previous work has revealed that the actual protection offered by these controls 
is rather limited (Virvilis et al., 2014), (Tsalis et al., 2015a), (Virvilis et al., 2015), (Tsalis et 
al., 2015b) and (Mylonas et al., 2013). 
Private browsing is a security control implemented by all popular web browsers, in order to 
provide enhanced privacy to the end user while browsing the web (Google, 2016a), (Google, 
2016b) (Mozilla, 2016), (Microsoft, 2016a) and (Opera, 2016). Its primary goal is to protect 
the confidentiality of users’ data, which are generated in a private browsing session, by 
avoiding to store them in the file system. In contrast, when the user is not under a private session 
(hereinafter this paper will refer this mode as normal mode), the data generated while she is 
browsing the web are stored in the filesystem for usability (e.g., facilitate authentication) and 
efficiency reasons (e.g., caching). Thus, private browsing can aid users to protect their privacy, 
against a local attacker who has access (temporal or permanent) to their device and attempts to 
uncover their online activities. After the revelations of state sponsored mass surveillance by 
Snowden (BBC, 2016), average users are concerned, more than ever, about protecting their 
privacy. In a recent survey (Gao et al., 2014), 200 people were asked about the use of private 
browsing. Nearly half of them (39.5%) stated that they use private browsing, so as to prevent 
their browsing history and any cookies from being saved.  
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This paper, examines the protection offered by private mode in popular web browsers, i.e., 
Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer and Opera. A specific set of web artefacts was surveyed, 
which are typically created in a normal browsing session, to uncover if and where these are 
stored after the private session is terminated, contrary to the browser’s documentation. There-
fore, this work uncovers the deficiencies of the private browsing mode in web browsers and the 
respective privacy violations. In addition, to estimate the impact of the findings, a user survey 
was performed so as to note user opinion, based on the tested artefacts and their importance. 
Lastly, this work proposes the use of a virtual filesystem as a countermeasure against the pri-
vacy violations that have been uncovered. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the related work. Section 3 
includes our methodology. Section 4 contains the survey and test results. Section 5 presents our 
case study. Finally, Section 6 adds a discussion and concludes our work. 
2. RELATED WORK 
To the best of our knowledge, research regarding private mode and its effectiveness, is still 
limited and in an early stage. To begin with (Aggarwal et al., 2010) was among the first to cope 
with the analysis of private browsing and the artefacts that were exposed after the private ses-
sion. More specifically, Aggarwal et al. tested a subset of the artefacts that are discussed in this 
work, in earlier versions of Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer and Safari. Also, the authors 
expanded their analysis in both extensions and plugins, so as to identify any security weaknes-
ses. They concluded to the inadequate implementation of private mode in those browsers, which 
exposed users’ activities. Additionally, they proposed a mechanism for Firefox, which protects 
against extensions that expose browsing artefacts after private mode.  
In 2011, Oh et al. (2011) focused on analysing the log files created by the browser, focusing 
on timeline analysis (e.g., timestamps), search history, URL encoding, search keywords and the 
recovery of deleted data. The authors proposed WEFA, a tool for evidence collection and ana-
lysis. Their analysis was limited only on the normal browsing mode and also the browsers’ 
versions used during the experiments are currently outdated. In (Said et al., 2011) the authors 
examined if private browsing artefacts were available in the system’s memory. The work in 
(Ohana and Shashidhar, 2013) focused on portable browsers (e.g., stored on a USB flash drive) 
and whether artefacts are still available after the session terminates. The approach resembles 
the work in (Said et al., 2011), in terms of capturing and analysing RAM, while the artefacts 
tested included: history, credentials, images and videos. 
The authors in (Heule et al., 2015) provided a control for that purpose, which is based on 
mandatory access control and protects sensitive data that may be accessed and used by Chrome 
extensions. Similarly, Lerner et al., (2013) focused on JavaScript extensions on Firefox, while 
in private mode. The authors verified a number of extensions, from a safety, behavioural and 
debugging perspective that resulted in identifying which extensions could be malicious. Satvat 
et al., (2014) expanded the work in (Aggarwal et al., 2010), by performing RAM, file system 
and network analysis, which revealed a notable amount of inconsistencies in the private 
browsing implementation. The authors created extensions for Chrome, Internet Explorer, Safari 
and Firefox to evaluate whether browser extensions leave artefacts that violate user’s privacy. 
Opera and Chrome’s guest mode were not evaluated and only a subset of the artefacts of Table 
3 were considered. 
Ruiz et al., (2015) focused on recovery techniques for page related data (i.e., text and grap-
hics) created during private browsing. The authors performed their tests within 4 individual 
phases: shutdown, freeze, kill process and power down, while each phase indicated the way the 
browser was terminated (e.g., kill process - browser interruption). Their results showed that all 
phases included flaws regarding user’s privacy, in terms of acquiring browsing artefacts. In 
addition, Montasari and Peltola, (2015) analysed both system’s locations and RAM, in all brow-
sers except Opera. Although the selected operating system is not clarified, it is implied that the 
authors used Windows for their experiments. Their results showed that Chrome is the most 
secure browser, since there are no artefacts available after private browsing, while Firefox only 
included low risk artefacts. 
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In a parallel work, Xu et al., (2015) studied private browsing using the threat model defined 
in (Aggarwal et al., 2010). They analysed the data flows that were generated by Firefox and 
Chrome with a system call tracer (for Linux) and detected the privacy violations that occurred, 
similarly to our work. To mitigate the identified privacy threats, they implemented UCOGNITO 
for Firefox and Chrome only, which also sandboxes the browser in order to control and delete 
the files that are created by the browser. UCOGNITO uses MBOX to redirect (write) access to 
the filesystem by rewriting file paths in a static location, which can be deleted after the private 
session. However, as in UCOGNITO the browsing artefacts are stored in the filesystem, they 
can be recovered even if they are deleted unless secure deletion is used (Gutmann, 1996), which 
is time consuming. In our work all the browsing artefacts are stored in a virtual filesystem, 
instead of a long term storage medium (e.g., hard disk). As a result, any browsing artefact can-
not be recovered when the electromagnetic load of the RAM is lost. In addition, secure deletion 
in the RAM is quicker compared to hard disks. Finally, the proposed solution can be used with 
any browser irrespective of its technology. 
In a similar approach, recent works focused on the forensic perspective of mobile versions 
of web browser. Marrignton et al. (2012) dealt with Chrome’s normal and incognito mode and 
the forensic traces left behind in comparison to the installed and the portable version of the 
browser. The results showed that both versions revealed the same amount of artefacts, thereby 
concluding that the portable version of the browser does not offer enhanced security guarantees 
regarding the user’s privacy. Moreover, Al Barghouthy et al. (2013) evaluated the available 
solutions that offer privacy protection to users. More specifically, they evaluated the Orweb 
browser that anonymizes network traffic and avoids saving the browsing history. Their results 
that the browsing artefacts (e.g., visited URLs, login data, etc.) can be retrieved even when the 
Orweb browser is used. 
In addition, a recent survey (Gao et al., 2014) focused on private browsing mode awareness 
from a user perspective. The authors surveyed 200 users regarding if, why and when they use 
this feature, and which are its benefits or drawbacks, if any. 
This work expands our previous work that focuses on the security mechanisms offered by 
modern web browsers. Mylonas et al. (2013) enumerated the security and privacy controls that 
are offered by the most popular web browsers in both desktop and smartphone platforms, find-
ing a considerable gap in their availability and configurability. Virvilis et al., (2014; 2015) and 
Tsalis et al., (2015a) evaluated the filtering mechanism that is offered by modern browsers in 
desktop and smartphone platforms against malware and phishing. Finally, Tsalis et al., (2015b) 
enumerated the available security and privacy add-ons and commented on the protection 
provided by modern web browsers.  
3. METHODOLOGY 
The scope of the analysis includes the popular desktop browsers (see Table 1)1 for Windows, 
i.e., Chrome v. 47, Firefox v. 43, Internet Explorer 11 and Opera v. 34. Windows 7 was selected 
as it was - at the time of conducting the analysis - the operating system with the largest user 
base (43.1% of the market share according to (W3schools, 2016b)). 
This work assumes that a user browses the web with a desktop browser in which the attacker 
has temporal physical access (e.g., Internet cafe, shared desktop). The user wishes to protect 
the details of her browser session and as such, she browses the web with private mode enabled 
and quits the browser without shutting down the workstation. It is also assumed that the attacker 
does not possess any forensic skills or tools, but is able to find any traces of the user’s online 
activity by simply browsing the filesystem.  
In this context, all the aforementioned browsers are used in private mode to evaluate whether 
they indeed provide the documented protection against privacy violations. To identify whether 
any traces of the user’s online activities remain after a private session, each browser was 
executed in private mode and online activities were performed. More specifically, we assume 
                                                 
1  Apple offered a Safari for Windows but it was excluded from the analysis as it has been discontinued 
since 2012 (Apple, 2016). 
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that the user in her private session performs online activities that will create the artefacts of 
Table 2. For instance, when she visits a website, bookmarks it and downloads a file, then those 
actions will create artefacts regarding: bookmarking, browser cache memory, browsing history, 
cookies, download list and downloaded files.  
Table 1 – Browsers’ user base (February 2016, (W3schools, 2016a)) 
 
Any changes to the filesystem as a result of these online activities were automatically moni-
tored. The online activities that were performed aimed to create data which are typically left 
behind during a normal browsing session (see Table 2). More specifically the artefacts that were 
generated can be classified as: (a) generic artefacts (Aggarwal et al., 2010), which is a set 
similar to the set of protected data sources compiled from the browsers’ documentation pages 
(c.f. Table 3) and includes simple browsing activities (e.g., bookmarking a webpage, downloa-
ding a file, etc.), (b) browser artefacts, which describe changes in the browser itself (e.g., in-
stalling a digital certificate, modifying browser settings) and (c) website artefacts, which inc-
lude per site configurations, such as website translation or website zoom.  
Table 2 – User activity categorization. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the set of artefacts that were examined by the authors of the relevant 
literature (see Section 2). To the best of our knowledge, no other work in the literature focuses 
on the superset of all the artefacts that we have tested. The majority of works in the relevant 
literature focuses on a subset of artefacts only, except for the work of Xu et al. (2015). 
Lastly, to measure the impact of the corresponding findings, a survey was conducted that 
measured user awareness. Specifically, the survey collected the users’ opinion about private 
browsing mode, and measured the impact of a privacy violation concerning the artefacts of 
Table 2. For readability reasons, the questionnaire that was used in the survey is available in 
the Appendix A. 
Table 3 – Artefacts tested by authors. 
 
3.1 Analysis Environment 
The browsers were monitored inside a virtual machine running Windows 7. Every browser 
was installed using the default installation settings in a different snapshot of the virtual machine. 
This initial clean state of the analysis environment was retained and was restored if needed in 
the analysis. As a result, this setup avoided any instances of cross contamination issues during 
the analysis.  
To monitor any changes in the filesystem and the registry that occurred during the private 
sessions, all the relevant events created by the process of each browser were collected, in the 
same way dynamic malware analysis is conducted (Sikorski & Honig, 2012). To this end, bat 
scripts were facilitated that utilized process monitor v. 3.2 (Microsoft, 2016c), for the collection 
and parsing of all the modifications (events) occurred by the browsers’ process. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 User survey 
As mentioned previously, a large percentage of users choose to enhance their privacy by 
utilizing the private mode for their browsing activities. Therefore, it is important to collect the 
users’ perception regarding private browsing and its features. This will allow to compare the 
priorities set by the users against the ones set by the manufacturers of modern web browsers. 
In this context, this subsection presents the results of a survey that focused on capturing user 
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opinions and perceptions regarding the artefacts of this work. Our survey included 153 partici-
pants, having the following demographics: 53.6% were men, 26.8% studied at MSc level and 
73.2% at BSc level. 90.2% were Chrome users, 51% were Firefox users, 7% were Opera users 
and only 2.1% were using Internet Explorer.2  
Amongst the participants, 71.2% were aware of the existence private browsing, 9.8% were 
unaware and 19% were not completely sure about the existence of the security control. Also, 
we examined whether users read the documentation of private mode, since this would inform 
them which artefacts are protected via the use of such mechanism. The corresponding results 
revealed that only 1.3% of the sample has read the whole online documentation, 11.8% of them 
quite read it, 30.7% hardly read it and 55.6% have not read it at all.  
The following figureError! Reference source not found. summarizes the sample’s 
knowledge regarding the artefacts protected by private browsing. As the results indicate, the 
sample is more likely to consider that the artefacts remain after the private session if they are 
not mentioned in the documentation or the welcome page of private browsing. In addition, the 
figure summarizes the expectation of our sample with regards to the protection of their online 
privacy, in which sensitive data such as the browsing history and passwords should not be 
stored in the private session. However, this work proves that this expectation is not valid (see 
Section 4.4). 
Figure 1 – Sample responses regarding the artefacts that do not remain after private browsing. 
Table 4 Error! Reference source not found.summarizes the results from Q9 of the 
questionnaire regarding the number of respondents that would be very upset if an artefact was 
recovered by the attacker after the private session.3 The results reveal that the passwords 
(80.4%) and browsing history (62.7%) artefacts are the ones that would upset the sample the 
most if they were collected by the attacker. Conversely, the sample expressed least concern 
about the translation settings (41.8%), bookmarks (34.6%) and downloaded files (32%). The 
results also suggest that the artefacts auto-complete form data, browser cache memory, cookies, 
download list, and search terms, would upset one out of two survey participants if they were 
exposed to an attacker. 
 
Table 4 – The number of respondents who indicated they would be very upset if an artefact is exposed. 
 
4.2 Browser documentation 
The documentation for each browser was enumerated regarding the protection that is offered 
by each private mode. It is worth clarifying that each browser refers to this control differently, 
namely: incognito and guest mode in Chrome (Google, 2016a; 2016b), private mode in Firefox 
(Mozilla, 2016), InPrivate mode in Internet Explorer (Microsoft, 2016a) and private mode in 
Opera (Opera, 2016). Even though all the examined browsers offer this documentation online, 
this documentation is rather limited. More specifically, only Firefox and Internet Explorer 
provide adequate documentation regarding the protection of almost all the artefacts that are in 
the scope of the analysis. The rest of the examined browsers have a very limited documentation 
regarding this control, especially Chrome that provides as little as one simple sentence regard-
ing private mode.  
In addition, users can get additional information regarding the private browsing within their 
browser. Specifically, when a user opens a new window in private mode, a welcome page is 
presented that informs the user regarding private mode and redirect her to the official documen-
tation page. However, the user can be confused from inconsistencies between the information 
for this control, which is available in the online documentation and these welcome pages. More 
                                                 
2  The questionnaire (see Appendix A) allowed more than one option to be selected in Q5 to reflect 
participants who were using multiple browsers. 
3  Table 11 in Appendix B includes all the results from Q9. 
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specifically, Chrome (incognito mode) mentions the deletion of cookies on the welcome page, 
but this is not available on the online documentation. The same applies for the protection of 
downloaded files. Moreover, Firefox does not document what happens with passwords created 
and used during a private session. Internet Explorer states that the extensions are disabled, 
which is something that is not available in the online documentation. Finally, Opera provides a 
generic message that states “all the information connected with them will be erased”, which is 
rather vague (and invalid, as will be proven). 
Table 5 includes only the artefacts mentioned in the documentation, while using the follow-
ing notation:  is used when the documentation states that the artefact is available after private 
mode,  when it is not and “-” when the documentation does not include any information about 
that specific artefact. 
Table 5 – Browser documentation regarding private mode. 
 
There is no consensus regarding the data that should be protected. In fact, each browser 
selects a different set of artefacts to protect. For instance, Opera does not protect the passwords 
that are created in a private session whereas Firefox and IE do. Chrome does not document the 
absence or the protection of this data.  
4.3  Browser data sources 
4.3.1 Summary of modifications in the filesystem 
By monitoring the events that were created by each browser process, all the interactions with 
the system were identified. Table 6 summarizes the total interactions with the filesystem that 
occurred, with a breakdown of whether the browser created, deleted, or changed the attributes 
of a file or folder. One would consider that during a private session only a few or none changes 
should occur to the system. However, the results invalidate this assumption. Table 7 summari-
zes the paths in the filesystem in which these modifications occurred. 
Table 6 – Total interactions found in the filesystem during the private mode. 
Table 7 – Paths that were modified in the filesystem.  
 
4.3.2 Location and analysis of artefacts 
When a user browses the Internet, she performs specific activities, which generate artefacts 
based on the type of the performed activity. For instance, when the user bookmarks a website 
this action creates a new entry in the files which are used by the browser to store browsing data. 
Thus, if these entries are retrievable after the private session they constitute a privacy violation, 
revealing the user’s browsing actions. 
4.3.2.1 Generic artefacts 
The analysis revealed that during a private session none of the browsers allow the user to 
save auto-complete form data and, with the exception of Opera, passwords. Opera in particular 
allows the user to store passwords in private mode (see Figure 2). Also, the username is stored 
in the “LoginData” file, but the password is only visible via the browser itself (i.e., following 
the path in the browsers interface Settings  Privacy & Security  Manage Saved Passwords 
 Show). Session cookies and search terms do not remain in the filesystem after the private 
session. 
Figure 2 – Snapshot of password artefact in Opera. 
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The analysis revealed that all browsers protect the “download list” artefact, i.e., all the 
browsers do not keep the list of files the user downloaded during the private session. However, 
as these files remain in the filesystem (see Table 8) the compilation of this list is straight-
forward. This holds true as, all the downloaded files can be found in the download folder of 
each browser after private mode, unless the user manually deletes them. 
As summarized in Table 8, the bookmarks that are created during a private session remain 
in the filesystem, with the exception of Chrome’s guest mode that disallowed the creation of 
bookmarks. More specifically, in Firefox bookmarks are stored in the “places.sqlite” database, 
along with the creation timestamp of last access as shown in Figure 3. In Chrome, bookmarks 
are saved in the “bookmarks” file (Figure 4), along with their creation and/or modification 
timestamp. Similarly, in Opera, bookmarks are saved in the “bookmarks” file in the browser’s 
directory (Figure 5). Lastly, Internet Explorer places the bookmarks in the Windows “favouri-
tes” folder (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 3 – Snapshot of bookmark artefact in Firefox. 
Figure 4 – Snapshot of bookmark artefact in Chrome. 
Figure 5 – Snapshot of bookmark artefact in Opera. 
Figure 6 – Snapshot of bookmark artefact in ΙΕ. 
 
While all browsers attempt to delete the browsing history after the private session, the ana-
lysis revealed that it can be inferred from browser’s cache memory and bookmarks in Firefox 
and Chrome. Specifically, when a user bookmarks a webpage, Chrome and Firefox store addi-
tional data about the bookmarked website, which reveal that the activity was performed during 
private mode. Chrome creates a new profile page in the history database and it marks the hidden 
field with a “1” (Figure 7), which suggests that the bookmark was created in private mode. 
Similarly, Firefox creates a new entry in the moz_bookmarks field of the places.sqlite file (Figure 
8). This entry contains a unique id, which correlates with the moz_history_visits field of the same 
file (Figure 9) and indicates the visit. 
 
Figure 7 – Snapshot of bookmark artefact revealing Chrome’s history. 
 
Figure 8 – Location of bookmark artefact in moz_bookmarks. 
 
Figure 9 – Website visit id in moz_history_visits. 
 
Finally, in almost all browsers the cache memory does not remain after the private session. 
In Firefox however the ocsp responses remain in the browser’s cache folder. The ocsp protocol 
is used by the browser to check the validity of a digital certificate (Santesson et al., 2013), but 
as shown in Figure 10 leaks part of the user’s browsing history.  
 
Figure 10 – OCSP responses’ snapshot in Firefox cache memory. 
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4.3.2.2 Browser artefacts  
When a user modifies or views the browser’s settings, she is redirected to the same settings 
window that is used in normal mode. As a result, any changes in the browser’s settings will still 
be available after private browsing is terminated. Note that this applies to all of the tested brow-
sers except Chrome’s guest mode, where the user can only configure the browser’s search en-
gines (Figure 11). 
Figure 11 – Snapshot of Chrome’s guest settings. 
 
Furthermore, while Chrome’s guest mode offered very limited access to the browser’s set-
tings, a user can manually access them via manually browsing to chrome://settings/content 
(Figure 12). Note that the user can even update Chrome via the guest mode, by visiting the 
“about” field. These settings, except for the browser update, only apply to the guest mode and 
the changes are not available in normal mode. In contrast, these are available in the preferences 
file in Google’s Guest profile folder. Thus, the user can manually visit and change the settings, 
which may result in revealing specific artefacts. For instance, if the user modifies the content 
settings and blocks the cookies from a specific website, this will still be available after the 
private session, and thus reveal the corresponding browsing activities. 
Figure 12 – Snapshot of Chrome’s guest content settings. 
 
The user can navigate in all browsers to the corresponding add-ons/extensions panel and 
interact with them in private mode. More specifically, the user can view, modify and delete 
existing ones, or even install new ones from the browser’s repository. These will be available 
in normal mode, along with any changes in their settings. Thus, if she installs an add-on which 
is specific to one of the tested artefacts (e.g., history - ad-blocker), this will result in disclosing 
the user’s activities performed (e.g., blocked website), since the change will also be available 
during normal mode. As a result, the blocked website will remain in the installed add-on and it 
is straightforward to infer that this website was visited (i.e., history) 
While in private mode the user is able to delete existing certificates and add new ones. For 
instance, when a new certificate is added to Firefox, a new entry is created in the “cert8.db” 
file, while the same applies to the remaining browsers which use the system’s certificates. And 
since the certificate includes the corresponding website, the user’s history is available, as far as 
websites with certificates is concerned. During the analysis, only Chrome’s guest mode does 
not offer the functionality to access the system’s certificates. 
Similarly, the user can access the browser’s plugins, through the settings panel in any brow-
ser, which is already discussed earlier. Thus, any changes will still remain in normal mode in 
all browsers (why is this important). It should be noted that in the case of Chrome’s Guest 
mode, any changes in these settings only apply to the guest profile and are stored in the prefe-
rences file in Google’s Guest profile folder. 
4.3.2.3 Website artefacts 
Both in normal and private mode, the user has the option to set settings that are valid for a 
specific web page/domain. These settings are referred as permissions and define how the brow-
ser will present specific content, such as images. Firefox is the only browser that groups these 
settings together in a panel, while the rest browsers allow a user to modify them either by visi-
ting the “settings” panel, or by configuring them in an ad-hoc manner. For instance, full screen 
is set with a pop-up message. Note that in Chrome’s guest mode, the changes are only available 
while guest mode is enabled, but are stored in the “preferences” file. Thus, since the permis-
sions operate at a per-website basis, any change will include the website itself in the above 
mentioned file and as a result expose the “history” artefact. Similarly, Chrome, Internet Explo-
rer and Opera store these changes in their default folders (as depicted in Table 8), while Firefox 
uses the “permissions.sqlite” file. 
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Figure 13 – Snapshot of permissions artefact in Firefox. 
All browsers except for Firefox and Opera allow the user to translate a webpage or choose 
to never translate a web page. The analysis has revealed that this action in Internet Explorer 
does not leave any traces in its preferences folder. More specifically, the browser uses 
bing.com, which is automatically visited when the user translates a website. Thus, traces regar-
ding this action can only be found in the DNS records (Figure 14), where the translated website 
is also included. In contrast, in Chrome (in both incognito and guest mode) user’s translation 
preferences are stored in the “preferences” file, which is available in each mode’s folder. For 
instance, Figure 15 depicts data regarding the user’s language preferences in incognito mode – 
i.e., blocked languages, blacklisted websites, etc. Lastly, the results suggest that a website’s 
zoom level cannot be recovered in the file system after a private session. 
 
Figure 14 – Snapshot from DNS records. 
Figure 15 – Snapshot of translation in Google’s Incognito mode. 
4.4 Summary of findings 
Table 8 summarizes the privacy protection that is offered by each web browser against an 
attacker who has unauthorized access to the user’s device after the use of private mode. 
Moreover, the analysis of the privacy protection that is offered by private mode in each browser, 
uncovered inconsistencies in the documentation of this control, are summarized in Table 9. 
Both tables use a superset of symbols that have been used previously, namely define: the sym-
bol  is used when an artefact which is created/modified during private mode remains after the 
session terminates, the symbol  depicts that the artefact does not remain, the symbol  in-
dicates that the artefact is indirectly available after the session (see comments in the analysis), 
and the symbol  is used when the browser does not allow the creation/modification of the 
artefact during the private mode. We mark with grey the cases in which there is a mismatch 
between the documentation and the analysis results or the cases in which we find an undocu-
mented artefact remaining after the private session.   
Chrome. During the analysis of incognito mode, almost all of the artefacts were revealed, 
except for: browser cache memory, cookies, passwords and zoom level. The same applies to the 
guest mode, where the browser did not offer the option to bookmark a webpage, while the 
permissions were not stored in the file system. 
Firefox. The results were similar to Chrome’s incognito mode, while there was not any 
website translation option available by Firefox. Also, the use of the ocsp protocol disclosed the 
browsing history within the ocsp responses.  
Internet Explorer. Similarly, the analysis of InPrivate mode yields similar results to 
Chrome’s incognito mode, with the exception of the “download list” artefact that was not saved 
in the filesystem. 
Opera. The protection of the web artefacts in Opera’s private mode is similar to Firefox’s. 
However, the browser cache memory cannot be retrieved from the filesystem after the private 
session. In addition, only Opera enables the user to save her password during a private session, 
which is not deleted after the completion of the session. 
 
Table 8 – Overall results of the protection that is offered by private mode in each browser. 
† 
 
The analysis revealed two facts regarding the protection that is offered to the user by private 
sessions: (a) some artefacts that are created in private sessions are not included in the 
documentation of this control and most of the cases remain after the end of the browsing session 
and (b) some artefacts remain in the filesystem after the private browsing session even though 
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the documentation states otherwise. One should note that in both cases this results in a privacy 
violation, as these artefacts can be collected by the attacker. However, in the second case the 
control creates a false sense of privacy protection as the documentation promises to discard the 
data after the private session. Also, in the first case (assuming that a privacy concerned user 
will go through the relevant documentation pages) the user is not informed that the artefact is 
created and that it remains in the file system after using private browsing. 
 
Table 9 – Comparison of the documentation with the results from the analysis regarding the protection 
that is offered by private mode in each browser. 
†
 
 
As proved through the survey presented in Section 4.4, users would be very upset if a 
specific subset of browsing artefacts could be retrieved after a private session, namely the 
browsing history and the passwords. According to our results the control’s documentation states 
that the majority of these artefacts are unavailable after a private session. Our analysis however 
revealed instances in which these artefact are exposed to a local attacker even after the termi-
nation of the private session. This holds true, as (a) the browsing history in both Chrome and 
Firefox can be retrieved through the bookmarks, (b) passwords are not deleted after the private 
session in Opera, and (c) the browsing history in Firefox can be retrieved from the ocsp respon-
ses.  
In other words, our work uncovers that artefacts that are considered critical based on user 
perception can be indirectly retrieved through artefacts with lower criticality. Moreover, our 
analysis showed that the medium and low artefacts can be recovered after the private session 
in almost any browser. Therefore it is alarming that the users are unaware of this correlation 
that can be performed between the artefacts they consider of low importance in order to reveal 
the critical ones.   
5. CASE STUDY: VIRTUAL FILESYSTEM VS. PRIVACY VIOLATI-
ONS 
This work proves that currently private sessions in all browsers fail to protect the confiden-
tiality of the artefacts that are created while a user is browsing the web, even against a local 
attacker who has no forensic knowledge or tools. This holds true, as the artefacts are stored in 
the filesystem within each browser’s folder that is used for data storage or caching. Thus, their 
unauthorized physical access is considered to be trivial. To mitigate this threat, this work 
proposes the use of a virtual filesystem as a countermeasure against the privacy violations that 
have been uncovered.  
A virtual filesystem is stored in a volatile storage medium, i.e., the RAM instead of a long 
term storage medium, e.g., hard disk. Currently, software exists that creates a one-off volatile 
virtual filesystem that the browser can use to operate and support the browsing activities of the 
user. Such software is available in all popular operating systems for desktops, e.g., RAMDisk 
(RAMDisk, 2016)) for Windows, i.e., Linux (JamesCoyle, 2016) and OS X (Tanous, 2016). 
This section will verify if the data that were stored in the virtual filesystem (i.e., in the RAM) 
were properly deleted upon the termination of the private session. For this reason, we focus on 
two scenarios: a) using software that creates the virtual filesystem and erase its contents after 
its use and b) using a file shredder in order to securely erase the contents of the virtual filesys-
tem. In each scenario, we locate the virtual filesystem in memory and examine if its contents 
have indeed been deleted. 
5.1 Countermeasure setup 
In this case study RAMDisk was selected to create the virtual filesystem in Windows. 
Windows was the selected operating system, as it has the largest user base. Upon installation 
of RAMDisk, the browser is configured to use a new destination path to store any data and 
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settings to a RAM location, instead of the default filesystem location. All popular desktop 
browsers allow this configuration via their interface. Table 10, summarizes the configuration 
steps that are necessary for each browser in our scope. 
Table 10 – Browser configuration steps (RAMDisk, 2016) 
5.2 Verification of the proposed countermeasure 
The first scenario of the case study uses RAMDisk as the software that creates the virtual 
filesystem for storing the user’s private browsing artefacts, while using the tool’s capability of 
erasing the part of the memory where the virtual disk resides, after the process is terminated. 
Upon creating the virtual filesystem we enabled the tool’s erase functionality in the software’s 
configuration and created a volume having only a FAT partition. We configured a browser in 
the scope of analysis (Firefox in this scenario) to use the filesystem as described above. Also, 
we placed an existing browser cache in order to make the scenario realistic. We browsed the 
web and a JPEG file was downloaded to simulate the user’s behaviour. While the RAMDisk 
process was still alive, a memory dump was acquired. After terminating RAMDisk’s process, 
another memory dump was acquired. In both cases, we identified and isolated the memory 
pages where the filesystem resides. 
The two memory dumps were compared with the use of a hex editor in order verify if the 
data that were stored in the virtual filesystem were indeed deleted. As demonstrated in Fig. 16, 
offset 0x19954000 of the first memory dump contains the boot sector of the virtual disk. At 
the same offset of the second memory dump, the boot sector has been replaced by zeros, as 
shown in Fig. 17. The same applies for all the data (e.g., files, folders) that have been stored in 
the virtual filesystem. For readability reasons, this is demonstrated with the aid of a snapshot 
of the image’s contents, which was downloaded in this scenario. As shown in Fig. 18, the header 
of the file was found at offset 0x17C60000 of the first memory dump. The figure also shows 
part of the contents of the file. On the second dump, the header as well as the contents of the 
file have been replaced by zeros, as presented in Fig. 19. Consequently, our results prove that 
RAMDisk’s erasing functionality indeed erases the virtual filesystem’s data, and therefore all 
the browsing contents from memory. Therefore, RAMDisk or any other software that offers 
similar functionality, can be used as a countermeasure to protect the user from the privacy 
violations that have been discussed in Section 4. 
In the second scenario we worked similarly but this time did not enable the tool’s erasing 
functionality upon process termination. Instead, we securely deleted all the browser related files 
with the use of a file shredder (File Shredder, 2017). Again a real browser cache and a JPEG 
file were used replicating the first scenario. A first memory dump was acquired before the 
deletion of the files and a second after it, while the process was still alive – as otherwise the 
virtual disk would be inaccessible to the file shredder.  
After the isolation of the corresponding process’ memory space from both dumps, the 
extracted data were analysed via a hex editor. As expected, Figures 20-21 demonstrate that the 
boot sector of the virtual disk can be found in offset 0x14436036 in both dumps. This is not 
surprising as (i) the virtual disk is still mounted through the RAMDisk process and (ii) the file 
shredder does not erase the filesystem’s structure. As before, the header and a part of the JPEG 
file are located in the first dump at offset 0x17845A00, as shown in Fig. 22. After the secure 
deletion of the virtual filesystem this part of the memory is overwritten with zeros, as depicted 
in Figure 23. Consequently, the file shredder successfully erased any browsing related traces, 
thus protecting the web user’s privacy. 
It is worth noting that the complexity of the performed browsing actions does not affect the 
results of the erasing process in both scenarios. This holds true as in both cases all the involved 
files, folders and the filesystem data structures that describe them are securely deleted. More 
specifically, in the first scenario the whole filesystem (data structures along with metadata, files 
and folder) get nullified. In the second scenario the file shredder will securely wipe all the 
folders and files selected by the user. Thus, assuming that the browsing profile folder is 
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selected, then the files, folders and their respective metadata in the file system structures will 
be wiped. 
 
Figure 16 – FAT boot sector of the Scenario 1 while RAMDisk’s process is alive.   
Figure 17 – FAT boot sector of the Scenario 1 after the termination of RAMDisk’s process. 
Figure 18 – JPEG header and beginning of its contents of the Scenario 1 while RAMDisk’s process 
is alive. 
Figure 19 – JPEG header and beginning of its contents of the Scenario 1 after the termination of 
RAMDisk’s process. 
Figure 20 – FAT boot sector of the Scenario 2 before the use of the file shredder. 
Figure 21 – FAT boot sector of the Scenario 2 after the use of the file shredder. 
Figure 22 – JPEG header and beginning of its contents of the Scenario 2 before the use of the file 
shredder. 
Figure 23 – JPEG header and beginning of its contents of the Scenario 2 after the use of the file 
shredder. 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Web browsers offer private browsing mode, a security control that protects user’s privacy 
against an attacker who has physical access to the user’s device. The presence of this security 
control allows the user to browse the Internet, without having concerns about whether her online 
actions will be available to another user who will subsequently use the same device.  
This paper evaluates the level of protection against privacy violations that is provided by 
private sessions, as they are implemented by the current popular web browsers in the Windows 
platform. Windows was selected as it is currently the operating system with the largest user 
base in desktops, therefore, ensuring the representativeness of this work. Chrome, Firefox, In-
ternet Explorer and Opera were monitored during private sessions that were mounted, with the 
aim to identify any browsing artefacts that remained after the termination of the private session. 
This work identifies instances in which the official documentation of each browser is either (a) 
inadequate, as artefacts that are created during the private sessions were not part of the docu-
mentation, or (b) inconsistent, as artefacts that were documented to be deleted after the private 
session were found, directly or indirectly in the filesystem. In both cases, a user who has phy-
sical access to the device with moderate IT skills is able to access the profile directories of the 
aforementioned browser and access the browsing artefacts.  
This work also includes a user survey with a two-fold purpose: (a) categorizing the findings 
based on user opinion regarding their importance and significance and (b) exploring whether 
the priorities in protecting web assets set forth by the web browsers are consistent with the 
priorities as collected by their users.    
Overall, our results revealed that private mode has room for improvement, regarding desktop 
web browsers. The evaluation of the protection offered by each browser revealed inconsisten-
cies regarding the artefacts documented not to be available after a private session is terminated. 
Specifically, as discussed in Section 4, there were artefacts that were not included in the docu-
mentation, as well as others that can be recovered after the private session, even though the 
documentation states otherwise. Thus, an average user who has read the browser’s documenta-
tion for private browsing would be either ignorant about the existence of some browsing arte-
facts during private mode or misled as the security control is not efficient.  
Almost none of the tested browsers documented or informed the user regarding the browser 
and website artefacts, as defined in Table 2. As a result, all browsers have a considerable set of 
artefacts exposed to local attackers. More specifically, based on the results in Table 8, almost 
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all browsers offered a similar protection to the artefacts that were tested, with the exception of 
Chrome’s guest mode. 
Our analysis revealed that all of the browsers protect the majority of the artefacts that the 
users consider as most important with regards to their privacy. However, as expected, during 
this impact valuation the users did not take into consideration the indirect impact of some arte-
facts with a low or medium valuation. For instance, the majority of the users were least concer-
ned about the exposure of their bookmarks. However, as our results reveal, the bookmarks can 
be used to recover part of the browsing history, which was the second highest artefact in our 
survey results. Moreover, in principle, these were the web artefacts that the current implemen-
tation of the private mode in all browsers tends to forget to protect.  
Furthermore, the user survey showed that the users’ perceptions regarding the artefacts that 
are not available after the private session were consistent with the browsers’ documentation. 
Indeed, web artefacts included in the documentation or the control’s welcome screen were more 
likely to be identified by the sample as deleted after the private session. This is an interesting 
finding if one considers that the sample responses indicated that more than half of the partici-
pants did not read the documentation at all, while only 1.3% of them read it at a great extent. 
Lastly, a case study was used in order to explore how a virtual filesystem can mitigate the 
privacy violations that were identified in this work. Specifically, it was proposed that browsing 
artefacts can be stored in a virtual filesystem within a volatile medium (i.e., RAM) instead of a 
long term storage medium. Apart from the fact that any data cannot be recovered when the 
electromagnetic load of the RAM is lost, we examined two scenarios in which the contents of 
the virtual filesystem are erased (i.e., they are replaced with zeros). The first scenario uses 
RAMDisk’s integrated capability of erasing the memory occupied by the virtual disk. The se-
cond scenario utilizes a file shredder to securely delete the contents of the disk. Our memory 
analysis experiments did confirm that in both scenarios user’s privacy was successfully preser-
ved by replacing any browsing artefacts with zeros.  
6.1 Limitations 
Our work focuses on the latest versions (at the time of our experiments, i.e., March 2016) 
of the desktop browsers in the Windows operating system only. Other browsers that are avail-
able in other desktop operating systems (e.g., Linux, OS X) along with their mobile counterparts 
(Android, iOS) fall outside the scope of this paper. Moreover, the dynamic nature of the web 
browsers due to their frequent updates, add another limitation to our work, as browser functio-
nality – including security controls – may be altered or added in the future.  
Also, the survey results provide only insights of the users’ awareness and perceptions for 
the private mode and the impact of privacy violations regarding the artefacts that were exami-
ned in this work. In addition, the aforementioned results from the user survey are biased toward 
our sample demographics, but we regard these limitations as out of the scope of this work and 
we leave them for future work. 
Finally, our experiments proved that the contents of the virtual filesystem will be erased 
from memory. However, any data related to browsing artefacts (directly, indirectly) might re-
main in memory in other processes (such as web browser), in clipboard, or in residues of recei-
ved network packets. Nevertheless, this falls outside the scope of this work. 
6.2 Future work 
For future work, we plan to expand our survey and compare the views of both IT and non 
IT professionals, to investigate whether there is a notable difference among the two samples. 
Also, to further examine the privacy protection of private mode in modern browsers, we plan 
on including the analysis of web browsers in mobile devices, such as Android and iOS devices. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Athens University of Economics & Business, Dept. of Informatics 
Information Security and Critical Infrastructure Protection (INFOSEC) Laboratory 
 
This is a voluntary and anonymous questionnaire. Please read the following questions and answer 
honestly and responsibly. 
Researchers: Nikolaos Tsalis, Ph.D. Candidate (ntsalis@aueb.gr), Alexios Mylonas, Lecturer 
(amylonas@bournemouth.ac.uk), Antonia Nisioti (anisioti@bournemouth.ac.uk), Dimitris Gritzalis, 
Professor (dgrit@aueb.gr), Vasilis Katos, Professor (vkatos@bournemouth.ac.uk) 
1. Sex:   Male   Female   
2. Age:   ....….... 
3. Education:   PhD  MSc   BSC    
4. Which is the operating system of your personal computer? (you can choose more than one) 
Windows        Linux    Mac OS       Other (Please specify) ………....... 
5. Which is the browser of your personal computer? (you can choose more than one) 
Google Chrome   Mozilla Firefox   Internet Explorer   
Apple Safari    Opera   Other (Please specify) ……………….. 
6. Do you know what private browsing is? 
Yes    No     Not sure   
7. Have you read the browser’s electronic manual about private browsing? 
Extensively   Enough   Little   Not at all   
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8. Which of the following artefacts, in your opinion, do not remain in your computer after a 
private session? (you can choose more than one) 
1. Auto-complete form data   
2. Bookmarks    
3. Browser cache memory   
4. Browsing history    
5. Cookies     
6. Download list    
7. Download files    
8. Passwords    
9. Search terms    
10. Add-ons/Extensions   
11. Certificates    
12. Plugins     
13. Settings     
14. Permissions    
15. Translation    
16. Zoom level    
17. Other (Please specify) …..........  
  
19 
 
9. How much would it annoy you if some artefacts did remain in your computer after a private 
session? 
Artefact M
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t 
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Auto-complete form data      
Bookmarks      
Browser cache memory      
Browsing history      
Cookies      
Download list      
Downloaded files      
Passwords      
Search terms      
Add-ons/Extensions      
Certificates      
Plugins      
Settings      
Permissions      
Translation      
Zoom level      
Other (please specify) .....      
 
Thank you for your time and effort 
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APPENDIX B 
Table 11 summarizes the results from Q9 of the questionnaire that collected how upset the 
sample would become if an artefact was recovered by the attacker after the private session. 
Table 11 – Summary of the results regarding how upset the sample would be if an artefact is exposed. 
Artefact  Very upset Upset Little upset Not upset I do not know 
Auto-complete form data 45.1% 16.8% 16.7% 14.2% 7.2% 
Bookmarks 17% 16.1% 27.1% 34.6% 5.2% 
Browser cache memory 45.1% 23.5% 12.8% 8.8% 9.8% 
Browsing history 62.7% 15% 9.2% 11.1% 2% 
Cookies 52.3% 22.2% 11.1% 8.5% 5.9% 
Download list 33.3% 24.2% 19.6% 20.3% 2.6% 
Downloaded files 22.2% 22.9% 17.0% 32% 5.9% 
Passwords 80.4% 5.2% 6.5% 5.2% 2.7% 
Search terms 48.4% 18.3% 17.6% 13.1% 2.6% 
Add-ons / Extensions 13.7% 18% 28.8% 28.1% 11.4% 
Certificates 28.1% 22.2% 16.4% 16.3% 17% 
Plugins 10.5% 19.6% 28.1% 23.5% 18.3% 
Settings 14% 22.1% 25.8% 24.7% 13.4% 
Permissions 20.3% 25.5% 22.2% 17.6% 14.4% 
Translation 11.2% 12.4% 24.8% 41.8% 9.8% 
Zoom level 10.5% 11% 24.2% 34% 20.3% 
FIGURES AND TABLES 
Table 12 – Browsers’ user base (February 2016, (W3schools, 2016a)) 
Browser User base (%) 
Chrome 69.0% 
Firefox 18.6% 
Internet Explorer 6.2% 
Opera 1.3% 
Table 13 – User activity categorization. 
Generic artefacts Browser artefacts Website artefacts 
Auto-complete elements Add-ons / Extensions Permissions 
Bookmarks Certificates Translation 
Browser cache memory Plugins Zoom level 
Browsing history Settings - 
Cookies - - 
Download list - - 
Downloaded files - - 
Passwords - - 
Search terms - - 
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Table 14 – Artefacts tested by authors. 
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Generic artefacts 
Auto-complete elements x      x  
Bookmarks x  x    x x 
Browser cache memory x x   x x x x 
Browsing history x x x x x x x x 
Cookies x      x x 
Download list x      x  
Downloaded files x x  x x   x 
Passwords x    x    
Search terms x x    x  x 
Browser artefacts 
Add-ons / Extensions   x      
Certificates x      x  
Plugins         
Settings         
Website artefacts 
Permissions         
Translation       x  
Zoom level x      x  
 
 
Figure 1 – Sample responses regarding the artefacts that do not remain after private browsing. 
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36.00%
30.20%
49.00%
21.10%
31.40%
65.40%
19.60%
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Zoom level
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Download list
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Certificates
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Browser cache memory
Bookmarks
Auto-complete form data
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Table 4 – The number of respondents who indicated they would be very upset if an artefact is exposed. 
Artefact Very Upset 
Passwords 80.4% 
Browsing history 62.7% 
Cookies 52.3% 
Search terms 48.4% 
Auto-complete form data 45.1% 
Browser cache memory 45.1% 
Download list 33.3% 
Certificates   28.1% 
Downloaded files 22.2% 
Permissions 20.3% 
Bookmarks 17.0% 
Settings 14.0% 
Add-ons / Extensions 13.7% 
Translation 11.2% 
Plugins 10.5% 
Zoom level 10.5% 
 
Table 5 – Browser documentation regarding private mode. 
Artefact / Browser 
Chrome 
Firefox Internet Explorer Opera 
Private Guest 
Add-ons / Extensions - - - * - 
Auto-complete form data - -   - 
Bookmarks - -  -  
Browser cache memory - -    
Browsing history      
Cookies *     
Download list - -  - - 
Downloaded files  -  -  
Passwords - -    
Search terms - -   - 
* This is available only at the welcome page of the private mode. 
Table 6 – Total interactions found in the filesystem during the private mode. 
Action / Browser 
Chrome 
Firefox Internet Explorer Opera 
Private Guest 
Create 20 161 62 100 99 
Modify 34 28 24 13 20 
Delete 2  2 2 2 2 
Total actions 67 202 94 116 125 
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Table 7 – Paths that were modified in the filesystem. 
Browser Data source location 
Chrome 
incognito 
AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default 
AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Local State 
AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\ShaderCache 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\software\microsoft\SystemCertificates 
Chrome 
guest 
AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default 
AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Guest Profile 
AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\System Profile\databases 
Firefox 
AppData\Local\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\nyaofkb5.default 
AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\nyaofkb5.default 
Internet 
Explorer 
AppData\Local\Microsoft\Feeds 
AppData\Local\Microsoft\Internet Explorer 
AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows 
AppData\Local\Temp 
AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft 
AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Internet Explorer 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\software\microsoft\SystemCertificates 
Opera 
AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows 
AppData\Local\Opera Software\Opera Stable 
AppData\Roaming\Opera Software\Opera Stable 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\software\microsoft\SystemCertificates 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Snapshot of password artefact in Opera. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Snapshot of bookmark artefact in Firefox. 
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Figure 4 – Snapshot of bookmark artefact in Chrome. 
 
Figure 5 – Snapshot of bookmark artefact in Opera. 
 
 
Figure 6 – Snapshot of bookmark artefact in ΙΕ. 
 
 
Figure 7 – Snapshot of bookmark artefact revealing Chrome’s history. 
 
 
Figure 8 – Location of bookmark artefact in moz_bookmarks. 
 
Figure 9 – Website visit id in moz_history_visits. 
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Figure 10 – OCSP responses’ snapshot in Firefox cache memory. 
 
 
Figure 11 – Snapshot of Chrome’s guest settings. 
 
 
Figure 12 – Snapshot of Chrome’s guest content settings. 
 
Figure 13 – Snapshot of permissions artefact in Firefox. 
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Figure 14 - Snapshot from DNS records. 
 
Figure 15 – Snapshot of translation in Google’s Incognito mode. 
Table 8 – Overall results of the protection that is offered by private mode in each browser. † 
Artefact / Browser 
Chrome 
Firefox Internet Explorer Opera 
Private Guest 
Generic Artefacts 
Auto-complete form data      
Bookmarks      
Browser cache memory      
Browsing history      
Cookies      
Download list      
Downloaded files      
Passwords      
Search terms      
Browser Artefacts 
Add-ons / Extensions      
Certificates      
Plugins      
Settings      
Website Artefacts 
Permissions      
Translation      
Zoom level      
†  is used when an artefact remains after the private session,  depicts that the artefact does not 
remain,  indicates that the artefact is indirectly available after the session, and  is used when the 
browser does not allow the creation/modification of the artefact during the private mode. 
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Table 9 – Comparison of the documentation with the results from the analysis regarding the protection 
that is offered by private mode in each browser. 
†
 
Artefact / Browser 
Chrome 
Firefox Internet Explorer Opera 
Private Guest 
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Generic Artefacts 
Auto-complete form data -  -      -  
Bookmarks -  -    -    
Browser cache memory -  -        
Browsing history           
Cookies           
Download list -  -    -  -  
Downloaded files   -    -    
Passwords -  -        
Search terms -  -      -  
Browser Artefacts 
Add-ons / Extensions -  -  -    -  
Certificates -  -  -  -  -  
Plugins -  -  -  -  -  
Settings -  -  -  -  -  
Website artefacts 
Permissions -  -  -  -  -  
Translation -  -  -  -  -  
Zoom level -  -  -  -  -  
†  is used when an artefact remains after the private session,  depicts that the artefact does not 
remain,  indicates that the artefact is indirectly available after the session, and  is used when the 
browser does not allow the creation/modification of the artefact during the private mode. We mark with 
grey the cases in which there is a mismatch between the documentation and the analysis results or the 
cases in which we find an undocumented artefact remaining after the private session.  
 
  Table 15 – Browser configuration steps (RAMDisk, 2016) 
Google Chrome: 
Right click Chrome icon  Properties  Add string “--user-data-dir=” folder 
path”” after “chrome.exe”  Replace “folder path” with the RAMDisk path 
Mozilla Firefox: 
about:config  Add string “browser.cache.disk.parent_directory” as 
preference name  Add the new path to the RAMDisk path 
Internet Explorer: Tools  Internet options  Settings  Move folder  Select RAMDisk path 
Opera: 
Properties  Target  Add “--disk-cache-dir=your folder path” after 
“launcher.exe"  Add the new path to the RAMDisk path 
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Figure 24 – FAT boot sector of the Scenario 1 while RAMDisk’s process is alive.   
 
Figure 25 – FAT boot sector of the Scenario 1 after the termination of RAMDisk’s process. 
 
Figure 26 – JPEG header and beginning of its contents of the Scenario 1 while RAMDisk’s process is alive. 
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Figure 27 – JPEG header and beginning of its contents of the Scenario 1 after the termination of RAMDisk’s process. 
 
Figure 28 – FAT boot sector of the Scenario 2 before the use of the file shredder. 
 
Figure 29 – FAT boot sector of the Scenario 2 after the use of the file shredder. 
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Figure 30 – JPEG header and beginning of its contents of the Scenario 2 before the use of the file shredder. 
 
Figure 31 – JPEG header and beginning of its contents of the Scenario 2 after the use of the file shredder 
